Clinical judgement in violence risk assessment by Murray, Jennifer & Thomson, Mary E




Clinical judgement in violence risk assessment 
 
 
Jennifer Murray      
Glasgow Caledonian University 
  
Dr. Mary E. Thomson  




The present article discusses the three main approaches to violence risk assessment, 
clinical judgement, actuarial assessment, and structured clinical judgement, informing 
the reader of the comparative benefits and short-comings of these methods of violence 
risk assessment.  In particular, the present article highlights the controversy within the 
literature surrounding clinical judgement in comparison to actuarial assessments of 
violence risk, and proposes that the statistically significant ‘improvements’ of violence 
prediction when using actuarial scales in comparison to clinical predictions of 
dangerousness do not necessarily measure the skill of the clinician adequately.  
Specifically, an assessment of ‘dangerousness’ does not equal a prediction of violent 
recidivism.  It is argued that clinicians are not predictive forecasters of risk, as in actuarial 
scales, but are, rather, trained to manage risk.  In addition, suggestions for future 
research directions in the field of improving violence risk assessments are made. 
  
Keywords – clinical judgement, actuarial assessment, structured clinical judgement, 
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Within the field of violence risk assessment, clinicians are reported to be increasing 
their use of, and are indeed being encouraged to use, standardised risk assessment 
tools to supplement their own judgements (Scott & Resnick, 2006).  Historically, 
clinicians would be expected to conduct violence risk assessments based upon their 
own experience in practice using judgement alone, without the use of standardised 
aids (Harris & Lurigio, 2007).  While this approach is still common in practice (Cooke, 
Michie, & Ryan, 2001), increasing concerns over the accuracy of clinical judgements 
of violence risk assessment (for example, Monahan, 2001) have led to a vast number 
  




of tools and approaches being developed regarding the way in which violence risk 
assessments should be conducted. Three key approaches to the way in which 
violence risk assessments are conducted exist: clinical judgement alone; actuarial 
scales, which are standardised measures based on statistical models used to predict 
the risk of future violence; and structured assessment tools to aid clinical judgement, 
which allow clinicians to use their experience to make judgements in a clear and 
structured manner using standardised guidelines.  However, there is still a great deal 
of debate within the academic literature regarding the most effective approach to 
conducting violence risk assessments.  For example, while Quinsey, Harris, Rice, and 
Cormier (1999) suggested that clinical judgement should be replaced completely by 
the use of actuarial scales, Douglas, Ogloff, and Hart (2003) have criticised actuarial 
tools for being rigid, lacking sensitivity to change and failing to aid risk management 
and the prevention of violence. 
  
In relation to clinical judgement, the debate centres on the accuracy of the 
clinician’s ability to predict violence.  Although clinical judgement is reported as 
being the most commonly used method in clinical practice (Cooke et al., 2001), this 
approach has been widely criticised as inaccurate. In fact, Monahan’s (1984) claim 
that two thirds of all clinical predictions of violence are incorrect has been widely 
cited. In view of such claims, the present paper will discuss each of the three key 
methods of risk assessment, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, thus 
providing the reader with an adequate knowledge of the current situation 
surrounding the practice of violence risk assessment.  In order to achieve this, 
however, the wider ranging importance of clinical accuracy in violence risk 
assessments must first be understood. 
  
The accuracy of clinical judgements has been a highly researched area since 
Ashley’s (1922) research, which investigated whether released psychiatric patients 
posed a real criminal threat to the public.  In this research, the criminal behaviour of 
700 psychiatric patients was followed for three months after their release from 
hospital.  Ashley (1922) reported that only twelve of these patients had been re-
arrested for a variety of violent and non-violent crimes.  While this finding would seem 
to indicate a poor relationship between mentally ill individuals and criminal 
behaviour, Harris and Lurigio (2007) highlighted that the findings of Ashley’s research 
cannot be interpreted with high levels of confidence as the arrest rates for the 
patients and the general population were never compared.  Similarly, Thornberry 
and Jacoby (1979) followed up the rates of violent offences committed by 
individuals who had been released from hospitals for the criminally insane to civil 
hospitals as a result of judicial decisions.  While these individuals had previously been 
  




deemed as too dangerous for release, of the 65% who were subsequently released 
into the community, only 11% were re-arrested for violent offences. 
  
Studies such as Ashley’s (1922) and Thornberry and Jacoby’s (1979) would appear to 
indicate that mentally ill individuals in the past were unjustly confined due to faulty 
judgements assessing an above average level of risk of dangerousness which 
resulted in them being confined within facilities which were more restrictive than was 
perhaps necessary (Litwack, Zapf, Groscup, & Hart, 2006).  The long standing 
popularity of this field of research can therefore be attributed to its multi-faceted 
appeal and applications: it is important to assess the risk of violence accurately from 
both a legal and an ethical standpoint.  In relation to the former application, 
clinicians are called upon explicitly to conduct violence risk assessments within a 
legal setting (Dempster, 2003).  The apparent increase in the legal requirement of risk 
assessments has been attributed to a number of factors, including changes in the 
law relating to mentally ill offenders (for example, the Baxtrom Ruling, 1966, which 
led to 967 offenders being released or transferred from high security to low security 
psychiatric hospitals [Steadman & Cocozza, 1974]) in addition to the increase in 
media portrayal of violent crimes being attributed to mentally ill individuals and the 
subsequent public concerns and fear brought about by these factors (Douglas & 
Webster, 1999).  It has therefore been predicted that concerns relating to mentally ill 
individuals committing violent acts will remain a core issue in both mental health law 
and academic research alike (Monahan, 1988).   
  
The key focus of recent research relating to the field of violence risk assessment 
centres on the best methods used in predicting future violence, i.e., through using a 
clinical or actuarial approach.  This comparative vein of research has been popular 
largely due to the demands placed on clinicians to produce accurate and reliable 
risk assessments of future violence. There are now a large number of violence risk 
assessment tools available to the clinician when conducting a risk assessment. The 
particular tool chosen will depend on a number of factors, including the clinician’s 
preferred tool, the most suitable tool for the specific case (e.g., the VRAG for 
predicting recidivism in male violent offenders and its derivative scale, the SORAG, 
for assessing male sexual offenders [Quinsey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1998], the HCR-
20 for assessing risk of violence in a structured manner across a broad range of 
settings [Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997] and, more recently, the 
development of the PRISM for assessing situational/institutional violence [Johnstone 
& Cooke, 2008]) and which tool the funding body or employer uses or supports. 
  
Historically, clinicians would be called upon to use their own experience and intuition 
when conducting violence risk assessments.  This method, while still common in 
  




practice, has been highly criticised as being limited in terms of both accuracy and 
inter-clinician agreement (Hart, Michie, & Cooke, 2007).  While it has now become 
common within the literature to find statements which suggest that actuarial 
assessments are superior to unstructured clinical assessments, there is evidence to 
suggest that this may not be the case (Litwack, 2001).  For example, in an analysis of 
the statistical and clinical evidence, Greenland (1980) found that psychiatrists may 
have been more accurate in their prediction of violence than previously reported 
when the type of offender is considered and controlled.  Furthermore, through the 
utilisation of clinical experience when making judgements about the risk of violence 
posed by an individual, the clinician can assess emotional state throughout the 
interview.  For example, emotional traits such as lack of empathy and anger 
(Menzies, Webster, & Sepejak, 1985) and physiological and behavioural traits such as 
chanting, flared nostrils, flushed face and clenching of the jaw and hands (Berg, Bell, 
& Tupin, 2000) are among the indicators of violence that may not be detected 
through the use of actuarial tools alone.  The use of both actuarial tools and of 
structured risk assessment instruments in conjunction with clinical interviews has 
therefore been judged to be most effective (Scott & Resnick, 2006).  This 
recommendation harvests the benefits of both actuarial tools and clinical 
judgement (structured or unaided) while minimizing their limitations in practice.   
  
The VRAG is the most widely used actuarial scale for predicting violence (Cooke et 
al., 2001).  This tool was developed by Quinsey et al. (1998) in order to predict the 
likelihood of violent behaviour enacted by institutionalised adult males.  Although 
the predictive accuracy of the VRAG has been widely demonstrated, it has also 
come under criticism.  Critique aimed specifically at the VRAG highlights the issue of 
insensitivity to the type of violence committed: the level of severity of the violent act 
being assessed is not taken into consideration or weighted differently by the VRAG, 
and, as such, important information about the offence may be lost.  For instance, 
when using the VRAG the violent act of murder would carry the same weight as that 
of assault, despite the much greater severity of the consequences to the victim.  In 
addition, the VRAG does not take into account drug or substance abuse as a risk 
factor for violence, despite this factor being a key factor in predicting recidivism 
(Howard, 2009).  No specific reason is given for the omission of this important risk 
factor from the VRAG; however, it is logical that the omission would be based on the 
characteristics of the base sample.  That is, based on the sample on which the VRAG 
was developed, drug or substance abuse may not have been a common factor 
associated with violence, despite this being a key predictive factor in other 
offending populations.  Thus, while the information gathered through this tool may 
be of use in predicting risk, there is a possibility of missing important ‘broken leg’ or 
dynamic risk cues.  These so called ‘broken leg’ cues are changeable in nature and 
  




over time, with the classic example of an individual having a broken leg: in the short 
term, this would likely hinder the individual’s opportunity to engage in violent 
behaviour, thus lowering their level of risk and dramatically altering their risk 
management needs.  Thus, in this instance the clinician may choose to adjust the 
actuarial prediction to take into account this dynamic risk/protective factor.  A 
similar adjustment may also be made in the case of drug abuse (which, as 
mentioned is not included in the VRAG), thus aiding the formulation of the risk 
management plan while still taking into account the important risk factors 
highlighted within the actuarial tool.   
  
This cautiously adjusted actuarial approach is not, however, ideal (Kriegman, 2007), 
as clinicians tend to identify too many exceptions to the actuarial formula, thus 
modifying the prediction to a great extent (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989); however, 
Dawes et al. (1989) suggested that the inclusion of the clinician’s modifications does 
not necessarily aid the prediction, and if over-adjusted may, in fact, negatively 
affect the accuracy of the prediction.  In addition, practical limitations of time may 
not always allow for such ‘full’ and rounded assessments. 
  
While actuarial tools have been widely criticised for being rigid, lacking sensitivity to 
change and for not being generalisable to populations out with the sample on 
which they were based (Scott & Resnick, 2006), it is thought that these tools can be 
of great use to the clinician when gathering information in the initial assessment 
stages, since many of the factors included within actuarial assessments are those 
upon which clinical assessments are based (Litwack et al., 2006). 
  
In common with clinical judgement, however, actuarial tools are limited when used 
alone.  Within true actuarial assessments, no clinical judgement is present but instead 
strict, uniform rules and decision making criteria are adhered to.  It is largely 
considered that due to the statistical improvement in inter-rater reliability (Dempster, 
2003), that actuarial assessments of violence risk are superior to clinical judgements. 
In fact, Quinsey et al. (1999) have recommended the complete replacement of 
clinical evaluations of dangerousness with actuarial tools.  However, concerns 
relating to the highly variable nature of forensic cases have led to criticisms of this 
recommendation: because cases are diverse in nature and because it would be 
impossible to mathematically model every relevant clinical factor, to rely solely on 
an actuarial tool could cause potentially important indicators of violent behaviour to 
be missed. 
  
The use of structured clinical judgement has been seen as a step towards more 
accurate decision making practice, with this approach being based upon 
  




combining empirically established risk factors with clinical judgement (Douglas et al., 
1999).  This method of violence risk assessment is considered advantageous as the 
clinician is given some level of flexibility and discretion.  In addition, working to non-
weighted guidelines that are easily adapted to new cases (Hart, 2000) allows the 
decision making process to be recorded.  The factors on which the final judgement is 
made are explicit, as in actuarial tools, thus the level of inter-rater reliability can be 
considered as higher than would be the case with clinical judgement alone.  The 
HCR-20 is one of the most widely researched structured risk assessment guides and 
has been boasted as “the leading instrument of the structured professional 
judgement approach” (Lamont & Brunero, 2009).  This broadband risk assessment 
measure was developed by Webster et al. (1997) to assess violence across a range 
of situations, and has been validated in both forensic and civil psychiatric 
populations (Canter & Zukauskiene, 2008).  It comprises 20 items across three 
subscales: 10 Historical items, 5 Clinical items and 5 Risk Management items.  Unlike 
the actuarial tools of the past, the HCR-20 (and structured risk assessment tools in 
general) do not seek to predict violence, but instead aim to identify the presence of 
relevant risk factors, to assess and indicate the individual’s current level of risk posed, 
and to inform suitable interventions in order to best manage the presenting level of 
risk.  Thus, rather than predicting the risk of future violence that an individual poses, 
the HCR-20 instead acts to inform and manage this risk.   
  
In a similar manner as with actuarial tools, it has been reported that these structured 
tools are also being used in an ‘adjusted’ manner, with the guidelines proposed by 
these tools not being applied uniformly; instead, these guidelines are reported as 
being used in a selective manner, with expert users substituting their own techniques 
in individual cases (Garfield & Garfield, 2000).  This selective use, while not entirely in 
keeping with ‘evidence-based practice’ may perhaps represent one of the key 
attributes of violence risk assessment: each case is individual.  As instances of violent 
behaviour can be highly individual in nature, one must take into account that no 
single evidence-based risk assessment tool or set of guidelines can capture every 
aspect of every case.  As such, the experienced clinician may choose to 
supplement the risk assessment guideline with additional knowledge about the case 
that they feel is of paramount importance in assessing the level of risk posed.  While 
this was not an easy option when using the earlier actuarial risk assessment tools 
which were weighted using mathematical formula (e.g., the VRAG), structured risk 
assessment guidelines (such as the HCR-20) do allow the clinician some freedom to 
include additional information that they feel is relevant to the case, as the 
completion of the assessment is not only informed by historical or case file 
information, but also through clinical interviews thus preventing important ‘broken 
leg’ information from being ‘lost’ through the process of assessing risk. 
  




 Despite the controversy relating to the accuracy of clinician judgement (Borum, 
1996) and the reliability of actuarial tools used within violence risk assessments 
(Litwack, 2001), clinicians continue to be called upon within a courtroom setting to 
assess whether or not an individual poses a serious level of risk to the public (Litwack 
et al., 2006), as previously discussed.  Typically, clinicians in these circumstances are 
asked to assess the likelihood of an individual committing violent behaviour if 
released into the public (Rabinowitz & Garelik-Wyler, 1999).  However, within mental 
and forensic health services, clinicians are not primarily trained in behavioural 
forecasting but are instead trained in providing care for their patients and taking 
preventative action where vulnerable individuals may pose a risk of harming 
themselves and/or others (Rabinowitz & Garelik-Wyler, 1999).  It must be noted that a 
clinician’s assessment of an individual as ‘dangerous’ is not a guarantee or a 
prediction of violent behaviour, but is, rather, an indication that the individual poses 
a significant risk of committing a violent act in the future.  As illustrated by Litwack et 
al. (2006), while a patient may be assessed by a clinician as too dangerous for 
release, this individual may not commit violent acts when released.  This cannot be 
seen as a faulty judgement on the part of the clinician, who merely acted within 
their boundaries of responsibility in assessing the individual’s overall level of risk and 
was therefore not necessarily acting within a behavioural forecasting role.  In 
addition, while much of the research relating to clinical accuracy in the prediction 
of violent behaviour discusses judgements of ‘dangerous’ and ‘non-dangerous’, 
differences in terminology must be considered.  For example, in Kozol, Boucher, and 
Garofalo’s (1972) research investigating the accuracy of clinical judgements, 
individuals who were reported to be ‘dangerous’ and who were therefore 
considered within the research to be likely to commit violent acts were, instead, 
simply not recommended for release by clinicians. 
  
There is clearly a distinction between an individual being not recommended for 
release and being directly estimated to commit a violent act. The terminology on 
which dangerous and non-dangerous groups are categorised prior to making bold 
statements pertaining to the accuracy of clinician judgements must therefore be 
established within specific research.  For example, Lidz, Mulvey, and Gardner (1996) 
found that mental health professionals performed at a level that was better than 
chance when asked to rate cases on a scale directly assessing the clinician’s 
opinion of the ‘potential for violence’ over a six month period.  The authors further 
asserted, however, that due to considerable numbers of individuals who had been 
rated as having a low potential for violence committing violent acts (a measure of 
sensitivity) and a considerable proportion of those deemed as having a high 
potential for violence not committing violent acts (a measure of specificity) within 
the six month follow up period, that clinical judgements did not have a high enough 
  




level of sensitivity or specificity to produce accurate predictions of violence.  The 
terminology used in this study must again be considered, as rating the ‘potential for 
violence’ is once again not a pure prediction of violence.  As illustrated, it is clear 
that the findings of research relating to violence risk assessment are highly 
inconsistent, with Monahan (1988) going as far as to state that for every piece of 
research that may find an increase in the predictive accuracy of clinicians, another 
will find that clinicians perform at a level that is no more accurate than chance. 
  
Thus, in relation to the body of research concerning the accuracy of clinical 
judgements in violence risk assessment, it is of the utmost importance to take into 
account the differing contexts and definitions of ‘risk’ across different disciplines. The 
concept of risk encompasses “the nature, severity, imminence, and frequency or 
duration of harm – as well as its likelihood” (Litwack et al., 2006, pp.493).  Risk can 
therefore be considered as dynamic, with Hart (2000) further adding that risk, when 
considered in terms of violence prediction, is an unknown hazard that can must be 
predicted with a level of uncertainty.  From these definitions, it can clearly be 
extruded that there is no single-faceted definition of risk in terms of clinicians’ 
assessments of violence risk and prediction. 
  
It is for this reason that much of the previous research on clinician accuracy has 
since been criticised.  For example Kozol et al. (1972) conducted research into the 
accuracy of clinical judgements relating to predicting future violence.  They 
followed up a cohort of males who had been released from restrictive facilities over 
a five year period.  The sample consisted of 592 males who had been convicted for 
assaultive offences and who had been assessed by a team of mental health 
professionals using clinical interviews, life histories and psychological tests.  386 of the 
sample were released on the basis of being assessed as no longer dangerous, with a 
further 49 being released against the advice of a mental health team.  At the 
conclusion of the five year follow up period, Kozol et al. (1972) reported that only 8% 
of the non-dangerous sample recidivised, while 34.7% of those who had been 
diagnosed as dangerous were found to have committed a serious crime. 
  
The findings of Kozol et al.’s (1972) research have been widely cited as a 
demonstration of clinical predictions of violence being incorrect every two out of 
three instances (e.g., Monahan, 1984).  However, while it is reported that clinicians 
provided correct judgements of violence prediction in only 34.7% of the dangerous 
group, Kozol, Boucher, and Garofalo (1973) later reported that of the 49 dangerous 
patients released, at least fourteen would not have been diagnosed as dangerous 
had they been assessed in the latter half of the research due to the improved 
diagnostic techniques used.  In addition, it must always be considered with research 
  




reporting and measuring crime rates that criminal and recidivistic behaviour may 
indeed be higher than recorded.  Indeed, research by Hall (1982) indicated that 
only 20% of serious crime may result in arrest.  This is of utmost importance in assessing 
the level of accuracy in clinical predictions of violent behaviour when considering 
research of the nature of that by Kozol et al. (1972).  It must therefore be taken into 
account that apparently faulty judgements may, at least in part, be the result of 
inaccurate measures of recording criminal behaviour.  This can be evidenced by the 
findings of Klassen and O’Conner (1987): the authors found that by simply including a 
measure of self-reported violence to that of arrest rates, the accuracy of clinical 
predictions of violence could be increased by up to 27.8%. 
  
Kozol et al.’s (1972) research does, however, suggest that clinicians are significantly 
better at judging accurately cases of non-violent future behaviour than predicting 
future violence.  In addition, research by Rabinowitz and Garelik-Wyler (1999) found 
that psychiatric trainees staffing a psychiatric emergency room were better at 
predicting non-violence than predicting violence in newly admitted patients.  This 
finding is a positive indicator in light of the concerns raised relating to the possibility 
of excessively high levels of false-positive judgements resulting in individuals being 
held in highly restrictive facilities (Litwack et al., 2006).  That is, in light of the afore-
mentioned research findings, that the majority of the individuals who had been 
deemed too dangerous for release had not actually violently re-offended upon 
release, the findings of Kozol et al. (1972) and Rabinowitz and Garelik-Wyler (1999) go 
some way to alleviate the ethical concerns raised by the earlier research. 
  
There are clear ethical issues associated with the high levels of positive predictions of 
violence: if the majority of individuals who have been judged to be ‘dangerous’ and 
have therefore not been recommended for release have been shown statistically to 
not behave in a dangerous manner when released, should these individuals be 
incarcerated in the first place?  In order to answer this question, a number of factors 
must be considered.  These shall briefly be discussed, but it must be noted that the 
full range of ethical issues associated with violence risk assessment and detention 
cannot be covered in the scope of this article.  In terms of both a legal and an 
ethical standpoint, the Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards (Standards 7-3.10; 
American Bar Association, 1989) outline that an individual must have not only 
sufficient education and clinical training and experience, but must also have 
adequate forensic knowledge gained through specialized training or an alternative 
route in order for an individual to be court appointed to perform a forensic 
evaluation. The individual must, therefore, be adequately knowledgeable in both 
the required clinical matters and the associated legal matters prior to passing a 
judgement on the level of violence that an individual poses.  In addition, when 
  




assessing the level of risk that an individual poses, the expert must consider not only 
the individual being assessed (i.e., the offender) and the level of risk to the public, 
but also under what circumstances this level of risk will be best managed and in turn 
reduced.  Thus, where an expert may recommend that an individual not be released 
from detention, the decision is based on not only concern for safeguarding the 
public but also will consider what is best for the offender in terms of lowering their 
likelihood of re-offending through the implementation of interventions.  In addition, 
when considering issues related to re-offending, one must consider that the aim of 
an intervention, whether it is through the implementation of a clinical risk 
management plan or simply a period of incarceration, is to reduce the level of risk 
posed by an individual (Heilbrun, 1997).  In contrast, the aim of the majority of 
published violence risk assessment research concerns the accuracy of clinical 
predictions (Carroll, 2007).  If one considers that through the course of incarceration 
an individual may receive some form of therapeutic intervention (e.g., an anger 
management course), it then becomes somewhat intuitive that the level of risk 
posed will be lower at the end of the intervention/incarceration than that assigned 
beforehand.  Thus, if the intervention has been successful a negative relationship 
between the original prediction made (e.g., highly dangerous) and the likelihood of 
re-offending should be found. 
  
Furthermore, if clinicians are indeed efficient at predicting non-violence accurately, 
as would be suggested by Kozol et al.’s (1972) and Rabinowitz and Garelik-Wyler’s 
(1999) findings, there may be fewer ‘non-dangerous’ individuals, where the definition 
of dangerousness acts as a prediction of violence, incarcerated than would be 
suggested when taking solely into account the earlier research findings reporting 
high rates of false positive predictions of violence in those incarcerated individuals 
(e.g., Ashley, 1922; Steadman & Cocozza, 1974; Thornberry and Jacoby, 1979).  As 
can be seen, the issues surrounding the prediction of violent re-offending behavior 
found in the literature and the reality of offender reform and detention are complex.  
In order to judge effectively whether the high level of false positive predictions of 
future violence found in the literature is indeed that, or whether it is actually based 
on the success of the interventions applied to an individual, research which takes 
into account not only predictions of future violence and follow-up re-offending data, 
but also whether or not the individual had received any interventions must be 
conducted. 
  
Rabinowitz and Garelik-Wyler (1999) further emphasise this within their violence 
prediction research, stating that some form of preventative action or treatment may 
have affected the outcome of the target individual’s behaviour.  That is, where a 
prediction of violent behaviour has been made, any treatment or therapy received 
  




either while incarcerated or in the community may reduce the potential for 
violence. Thus, there has been a move within the literature which is driving the focus 
towards the management of risk, rather than the prediction of future violence. The 
very nature of violence risk assessment has come to be considered as an ongoing 
process, not a single standing assessment (Davidson, 1997).  This movement towards 
viewing risk assessment as an ongoing process relating to the management of the 
posing risk, rather than making a one-off assessment bases on static factors, is in line 
with the argument initiated by Davidson (1997); that the risk of violence posed by an 
individual is a dynamic factor and as such is subject to change over time.  Thus, 
rather than assessing the likelihood of risk, it is now accepted that risk must be 
managed. 
  
While great attention within the literature has been given to the various methods of 
improving the accuracy of clinician judgements, less detail has been paid to the 
actual processes used by clinicians whilst assessing violence risk in practice (Elbogen, 
2002) and the ways in which risk is managed in practice (Dempster, 2003).  In relation 
to this descriptive research, Elbogen (2002) reviewed three key areas of clinician 
judgement: cue utilisation (the risk factors utilised in decision making), clinical 
reliability and clinical decision making. 
  
In relation to cue utilisation, Elbogen’s (2002) review of the descriptive research 
relating to clinician judgements of violence risk assessment found that clinicians tend 
to over-emphasise the importance of certain crimes and under-emphasise others 
(e.g., murder and sexual offence, respectively).  It should be noted however, that it is 
not the primary aim of the clinician to predict future violence but rather it is to 
manage the risk of violent re-offending (Litwack et al., 2006), as previously discussed.   
  
Elbogen and Huss (2000) further specified that the context in which violence risk 
assessments are made may affect the types of risk factors focused upon when 
decision making.  For example, Menzies and Webster (1995) found that in a forensic 
setting, clinicians focused their decision making on previous violence, alcohol abuse 
and low anger control to a greater extent than other presenting cues.  Conversely, 
Quinsey (1995) suggested that clinicians rely on salient cues, such as extreme 
delusions, when assessing the risk of violence, even when these cues are not 
necessarily related to the case or indeed relevant.  Homan, van Knippenberg, Van 
Kleef, and De Dreu (2007) conducted research concerning the effects of differing 
levels of salience in group decision making which may be relevant when considering 
clinical decision making and violence risk assessments conducted within group 
settings.  In addition to levels of informational diversity to which the group was 
exposed, Homan et al. (2007) further emphasised the importance of the salie
  




social categories within the group.  The authors found that with increasing diversity in 
the social categories included within the group, increased conflict arose as a result 
of the formation of social subgroups.  This finding is theoretically considered to arise 
due to the difficulties experienced by groups when faced with exploring and 
accepting the perspectives of several subgroups (Bowers, Pharmer, & Salas, 2000).  
Conversely however, van Knippenberg, De Dreu, and Homan (2004) found that 
diversity of information within a group can lead to elaboration of task-relevant 
information, arguing that this increased exchange of information will aid the 
accuracy of the decision making process. 
  
These apparently opposing standpoints may, however, be considered as 
complimentary: in order for informational diversity to be exchanged and discussed 
by a group, sub-group categorisation must be minimal (Homan et al., 2007).  Thus, in 
order to attain maximal benefits within group decision making, informational diversity 
must be high and group heterogeneity must be minimal.  However, while the impact 
of group processes on decision making in violence risk assessment would appear to 
be extremely relevant within a clinical setting due to the increasing tendency for 
clinicians to conduct violence risk assessments in groups (Croskerry, 2005), research 
of this nature (that is, the exploration of social salience/subgroup categorization on 
group decision making) has largely not been empirically applied to the field of 
clinical decision making in violence risk assessment.   Thus, little is actually known 
about the possible effects that group decision making may have on judgements 
made concerning violence risk assessments.  It should therefore be noted that the 
research discussed here regarding group decision making in violence risk assessment 
does not and cannot cover every theory or model of group decision making, and 
indeed there is an entire literature on the topic of group decision making in contexts 
other than violence risk assessment that may be applicable to the field.  Future 
research investigating group processes in violence risk assessment, particularly 
investigating the impact of multi-disciplinary teams on judgement and decision 
making in this context, would therefore be beneficial. 
  
While it is recognised that not all of the aspects of group decision making that may 
affect judgement in violence risk assessment can be covered in the scope of the 
current article, a number of the main factors shall now be discussed.  For example, 
false congruence in decision making may occur as a result of group processes.  It 
has been well documented that in group situations the diversity of information and 
perspectives is often not exploited to full potential (Bowers et al., 2000; Homan et al., 
2007; Webber & Donahue, 2001).  While it is thought that group decision making may 
be better than individual decision making due to the ability to pool unique 
information (Hollingshead, 1996), it has been found that group discussions 
  




disproportionately reflect information that is know by all members of the group; thus 
making information that is known by only one member of the group less discussed 
and therefore less important in terms of weighting in the final decisions made by the 
group (Hollingshead, 1996).  This may then lead to a false sense of congruence in the 
final decision made and result ultimately lead to a less than optimal decision being 
made (Stasser & Titus, 1985).  However, Stasser, Stewart, and Wittenbaum (1995) 
found that the heightened influence of shared knowledge compared to unique 
knowledge in group settings could be decreased by making it clear to all members 
of the group that each member has additional, non-shared information.  With regard 
to violence risk assessment, when discussing a case the multi-disciplinary team 
should explicitly recognise the value of individual information that may not be held 
by all of the group members or indeed contained within the violence risk report or 
case being discussed.   
  
In addition, Hellingshead (1996) highlighted that through having access to 
information profiles rather than having to rely on memory alone, groups discussed 
both unique and common information to a greater extent.  However, when asked to 
write rationales for their decisions, groups who had access to the information profiles 
did not have a higher mention of the unique information when compared to groups 
who relied on memory alone.  Stewart and Stasser (1995) also found that unique 
information was omitted from recalled information where it was previously included 
in discussion, with the exception of when the unique information was presented by 
an individual who was considered to be an expert.  Homan et al. (2007) argued that 
it is not only the diversity of information and the way that this is shared within a group 
that may affect decision making, but also the diversity of the group members.  This 
has major implications in terms of the decisions reached by multi-disciplinary teams 
in violence risk assessment.  A recent study by Kettles, Gass, Addo, and Mckie (2009) 
found that key care decisions within intensive psychiatric care units still tended to be 
made by doctors and nurses, and that decisions made by medical staff held more 
authority than those made by other members of the care teams.  Kettles et al. (2009) 
concluded from these findings that inequalities in power still exist within multi-
disciplinary teams.  With a related focus on leadership in group decision making, 
Taggar and Ellis (2007) conducted research which investigated the role of leaders in 
shaping team norms, based on Feldman’s (1984) suggestion that team leaders have 
a strong impact on team norm development.  It was found that the prior 
expectations held by both leaders and other group members effect the formation of 
team norms, and that those leaders who held high prior expectations for team 
problem solving behaviours are able to compensate for a team’s lower 
expectations.  Taggar and Ellis’ (2007) findings therefore suggest that leaders play a 
critical role in forming and shaping team norms.  Taggar and Ellis (2007) further 
  




asserted that effective team behaviours are improved through formal norms being 
established at the beginning of team interaction.  If these norms are indeed 
influenced more by leaders than by the other members of the group, as suggested 
by Taggar and Ellis’ (2007) findings and by Feldman (1984), and if unique information 
provided by experts is weighted more heavily than information provided by other 
members of the team, it can once again create a false sense of congruence in 
decision making.  That is, while the team may agree to a particular decision, the 
level of importance placed on the opinions and wants of the ‘leader’ may be higher 
than those proposed by a group member ranking lower in the hierarchy, and may 
be discussed to a greater extent, thus leading to unique information that is perhaps 
as important or more important than that being considered being sidelined in 
discussions.  The decisions made based on the discussions may, in such cases, be 
biased towards the overall opinions and wants of the team leader, rather than 
representing the opinions of the team members. 
  
It should be pointed out that in group formation, team leaders are not necessarily 
those who are explicitly assigned the role, but are often assigned the role of leader 
through peer negotiation, spoken or unspoken (Seers, Petty, & Cashman, 1995).  
Leaders are often members of a group who are able to exert influence or authority 
over the team (Taggar & Ellis, 2007).  Taking Kettles et al.’s (2009) findings into 
account, it may therefore be assumed that in a forensic or psychiatric multi-
disciplinary team setting, the team leader is likely to be the individual perceived by 
the others to be most medically trained, e.g., psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, 
psychiatric nurses. 
  
With regard to group decision making, it is important that all group members are 
happy with the hierarchical culture of the group.  A successful hierarchical group 
culture should emphasise stability, rules, policy and regulations, while also 
accentuating teamwork, cohesiveness and participation (McComas, Tuite, Waks, & 
Sherman, 2007).  A successful hierarchical group culture will therefore foster not only 
a more satisfied organisational culture, but also will increase individual group 
member’s commitment (McComas et al., 2007).  The satisfaction of group members 
is important for optimal decision making in hospital and forensic cases making as it 
has been shown to improve performance and decrease the frustration that may 
otherwise be felt by members of a group (Zazzali, Alexander, Shortell, & Burns, 2007).  
In their research concerning group member’s perceptions of procedural justice, 
Zazzali et al. (2007) pointed out that when members of a group are unsatisfied with a 
process, they are more likely to view it as biased and are less likely to accept the 
outcome.  This may then lead to unsatisfied group members to lose interest and limit 
their participation in decision making discussions, an issue which, according to 
  




Zazzali et al. (2007), has the potential to limit the ability of the group to make 
informed decisions as representative input is not achieved.  To reiterate, when 
making judgements in violence risk assessment, not only should the uniqueness of 
information held by the group be made explicit and be taken into consideration, but 
so too should the diversity of the different group members in order to improve 
individual satisfaction and therefore group performance.  
  
It may be argued that due to the relatively low volume of research surrounding 
descriptive research in the area of clinician judgement, that the most commonly 
over-emphasised cues used by clinicians have not been fully identified.  This has 
major implications for the development of both actuarial scales and for improving 
clinician decision making alike.  For example, in an assessment of the SAGE 
assessment survey, an actuarial tool measuring self-reported aggression, Downey 
and Zun (2007) found that while the overall scoring of the SAGE was unsuccessful at 
identifying those at risk of partaking in violent behaviour, certain factors in the tool 
were effective.  While this would appear promising, the tool gives equal weight to all 
of the included factors, and thus the effect becomes annulled (Downy & Zun, 2007).  
Mills, Kroner, and Hemmati (2007) have further indicated that the inclusion of items 
that do not discriminate between recidivists and non-recidivists in risk assessment 
scales may indeed devaluate the risk assessment being conducted.  This therefore 
suggests the need for the identification of the cues most often over-emphasised in 
terms of importance by both clinicians and risk assessment tools. 
  
Ebogen’s (2002) review of the descriptive research further highlighted issues 
regarding clinical reliability - for instance, the measurement of inter-clinician 
agreement on specific clinical judgements.  It has been hypothesised that greater 
congruence in a decision made between clinicians will lead to greater reliability of 
that decision (Werner, Rose, & Yesavage, 1990).  However, research by Quinsey and 
Ambtman (1979) found low levels of reliability between health professionals when 
assessing dangerousness.  With regards to violence risk assessment, Werner, Rose, 
and Yesavage (1983) found similarly low levels of reliability in clinician decision 
making within the context of a psychiatric care facility when psychologists and 
psychiatrists were asked to make judgements of dangerousness.  However, when the 
scores of judgements of dangerousness made by the psychologists and by the 
psychiatrists within the sample were combined as a single group, greater levels of 
congruence, thus reliability, were apparent in the violence risk assessments made.  
Thus it would appear that greater reliability in clinical decisions of violence risk 
assessment may be apparent within group decision making than would be the case 
with individual decision making. 
  
  




Furthermore, research conducted by Skeem, Mulvey, Odgers, Schubert, Stowman, 
Gardner, and Lidz (2005) found that levels of violence prediction differed across 
mental health professionals pending on their professional role.  In an examination of 
this disagreement between estimates of future violence occurring, Lidz, Mulvey, 
Apperston, Evanczuk, & Shea (1992) found that the key sources of this disagreement 
may be levels of clinician experience in addition to organisational variables.  This 
finding would suggest that whist levels of accuracy increase with multiple decision 
makers being involved (Werner et al., 1983), when the decision making group is of 
multiple disciplines/levels of experience, greater levels of disagreement within that 
group may exist (Lidz et al., 1992).  The level of congruence in clinical decisions 
made in groups is of utmost importance in terms of the reliability of that decision: it is 
believed that greater accuracy in violence risk assessments may be achieved in 
group decisions made with high levels of agreement (Elbogen, 2002). 
  
As there are increasing requirements within violence risk assessment practice to 
make decisions in groups (Croskerry, 2005), it is of great importance that the 
implications of this alteration are understood.  For Example, the types of heuristics 
and biases used by all decision makers unconsciously (Croskerry, 2005) are argued to 
be different for individual and group decision making.  Thus, where the majority of 
past research in the field of clinical judgements of violence risk assessment has 
focused on individual decision makers, the findings of such research may not 
translate accurately with regards to group decisions in violence risk assessment. 
  
Further to this increasing tendency of group decision making in violence risk 
assessment, there is little apparent standardisation of the demographics of the group 
decision makers.  For example, in utilisation of the HCR-20 (Webster et al., 1997) and 
other risk assessment/management tools, reports are gathered from multiple sources, 
e.g., social services, prison officers, clinical psychologists, parole officers, 
psychiatrists.  While Andres Pueyo and Redondo Illescas (2007) point out that risk 
assessment is an individual process for the majority of mental health professionals 
and criminology experts involved in the task, through gathering data from multiple 
sources, as outlined above, and through different means (e.g., personal interviews, 
psychological and medical assessments, judicial and social records and the 
collateral recollection of information) and then discussing the initial individual 
judgements made with the multi-disciplinary team, the violence risk assessment 
process may then be considered, in part, as a multi-disciplinary process.  The use of 
multi-disciplinary decision making groups with varying levels of expertise in clinical 
violence risk assessment has neglected to be the primary focus of the majority of 
research in the area.  Whilst research, such as that by Werner et al. (1983), indeed 
investigated the differences between different types of clinical decision makers, 
  




subsequent research in the area has not appeared to progress to such a level as to 
explore the possible social impact of multi-disciplinary group decision making in 
violence risk assessment, in comparison to single-disciplinary group or individual 
clinical decision makers. 
  
In addition, Elbogen’s (2002) review highlighted the need for greater research in the 
area of clinical decision making on the heuristics and biases used by clinicians whilst 
making violence risk assessments.  Further to this, McNeil (1998) suggested that in 
order to improve clinician skill when making violence risk assessments, there must be 
at least an awareness of the possible cognitive biases that may be active with 
decision making. 
  
The present article has summarised the key points relating to the state of violence risk 
assessment, informing the reader of the use of clinical judgement, actuarial tools, 
and structured professional guidelines when conducting a violence risk assessment.  
The controversy surrounding clinical judgement and the actuarial assessment of 
violence risk in particular has been discussed.  In addition, the present article has 
highlighted the need for a greater focus on the ways in which risk assessment and 
management could be improved and informed through more targeted research 
investigating the actual process of violence risk assessment (e.g., Elbogen, 2002), 
and the need for research investigating the possible social effects of multi-
disciplinary group decision making, and the impact of cognitive heuristics and biases 
on the accuracy and efficacy of violence risk assessments. 
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